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Abstract 
 
Security prices in efficient markets reflect all relevant information. Past price formations 
and even fundamental analysis cannot guarantee abnormal returns consistently to any 
pre-identified strategy or market participant, be they novice or expert traders. There 
have been various studies done in past to test market efficiency in emerging markets. 
However, in this study, we take the approach of surveying the professional investment 
community and study their stated actions in making investments. Our results indicate 
prevalence of herding and overconfidence in professional analysts. We also find that 
analysts extrapolate past into the future forecasts. We also find association between 
demographic characteristics and choice of security valuation methods that analysts use. 
In line with Chevalier & Ellison (1998), we find that young people herd less in our 
sample than the old people.           
 
Keywords Investment Behavior, Behavioral Finance, Herding, Mutual Funds, Security 
Analysis, CAPM, Technical Analysis   
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1. Introduction to Asset Pricing 
 
Markowitz was the pioneer financial economist who set the foundation for Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT). MPT emphasized the role of portfolio diversification based on 
covariance analysis. MPT also gave a breakthrough in the definition and interpretation 
of risk. With MPT, it became clear that security‟s contribution to the portfolio risk is 
different and more important than a security‟s own risk.  
 
Asset pricing models were developed side by side with the advancements in MPT. One 
of the pioneering asset pricing models was developed by Sharpe (1964). In his model, 
Sharpe (1964) introduced certain assumptions. He assumes that investors select mean-
variance portfolio and investors share the same expected returns, variances, and 
covariances. He implies from these assumptions that every investor will hold exactly the 
same portfolio of risky assets. Since all risky assets must be held by somebody, a 
logical implication is that every investor will hold the “market portfolio”. 
 
Degree of risk aversion can be different in different investors and holding same market 
portfolio does not discount this possibility. Investors can always reduce the degree of 
risk they want to bear by holding riskless bonds along with the risky stocks in the market 
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portfolio. Hence, the portfolio composition can be altered through exchange of risky 
assets with non-risky assets. Risk neutral investors could also increase their risk by 
holding negative amounts of the riskless asset, i.e. by borrowing.  
 
Using a two-stage regression, Lintner (1965) performed the first empirical test of the 
CAPM. He rejected the CAPM based on his tests. Nevertheless, he studied individual 
stocks rather than portfolios. This shortcoming led to some incorrect estimates of beta. 
 
In later studies, CAPM was tested using portfolio returns rather than individual stock 
returns.  Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) found evidence to support the CAPM based 
on their test of portfolios. In another study, Fama and MacBeth (1973) found that while 
the riskless rate and beta explained the structure of security returns, beta squared and 
unsystematic variances did not. These results supported the validity of CAPM and that 
beta alone as a single risk parameter could be used in security valuation.  
 
But, in later studies, Fama and French (1992) found that stock betas did not explain 
long term return relationships. In their improved methodology, some additional variables 
like firm size and market-to-book ratios did explain the stock returns. Basu (1977) and 
Fama and French (1992) found that firms with low P/E ratios outperform firms with 
higher P/E ratios. Hence, the P/E ratio and the firm size were found to predict security 
returns better than the CAPM. 
 
Alongside CAPM, Ross (1976) published the seminal paper on Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT). This alternative equilibrium asset pricing model does not require as much limiting 
assumptions. The APT states that security returns will be linearly related to a series of 
factors. 
 
Although the single-beta CAPM lived its way to last more than thirty years of empirical 
research and challenging evidence, nowadays multi-factor models and behavioral 
models are employed more often in asset pricing. 
 
2. Investor Behavior: Behavioral Finance Perspective 
 
Behavioral finance tries to explain anomalous behaviour of security prices by the 
psychological biases in human cognition and irregularities in human behavior. Following 
is a brief list of various such biases and behavioral irregularities that have been 
established in empirical studies and experimental research.    
 
2.1. Representativeness Heuristic  
 
In this phenomenon, people expect that recent information represents the key 
population parameters well. Therefore, people tend to give more weight to recent 
evidence over prior beliefs and/or past data. Fallacy here is that representative data or 
observation does not make it likely to repeat in future.   
 
 
2.2. Herd Behaviour  
 
Herding refers to following the market consensus. It is not necessary that herding be 
considered irrational. It is a rational response in the face of uncertainty and lop-sided 
payoffs when deviation from the consensus is penalized more when it does not work 
than rewarded when it works. In next section, we report evidence from past studies that 
some fund managers, analysts and even CEO‟s mimic each other. 
 
2.3. Disposition Effect  
 
As explained later in prospect theory later as well, investors tend to avoid the situation 
of having to bear actual irreversible losses. People tend to hold losing stocks too long 
and sell gaining stocks too early. People believe that until they sell the stock at a price 
less than the purchasing price, loss has not occurred. Hence, they wait for the price 
reversal on stocks that have gone down in value. But, investors tend to sell gaining 
stocks too early so as to book gains immediately.      
 
2.4. Anchoring 
 
Investors often put more emphasis and credence on recent market information including 
prices. People tend to extrapolate from recent trends without confirming that the recent 
trends may differ from historical, long-term averages and probabilities. One form in 
which it is clearly visible in investors‟ behavior is that often people are willing to take 
more risk after they have had good earnings in recent past. Contrarily, they take less 
risk after incurring losses in recent past. In both cases, the risk taking may be different 
even if the fundamentals and other information remains same.  
 
2.5. Regret Theory  
 
Humans cannot always detach their emotions from investment decision making. This 
theory explains the emotional reaction people experience after realizing their errors in 
decision making. People are sometimes emotionally attached with the price at which 
they purchased the stock. Current market price and other information may suggest that 
past price is not relevant basis to value securities. But, the emotional attachment leads 
people to use it as anchor. This results in behaviors like delay in selling at prices lesser 
than purchase price so as to avoid the feeling of regret. 
 
2.6. Loss Aversion: Prospect Theory 
 
In loss aversion, the utility function is steeper for losses than for gains. This means that 
people have more disutility from a loss than the positive utility from an equal gain. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), this phenomenon is referred to as loss 
aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) empirically estimated the difference between 
the utility and disutility of equal amount of gain and loss and their estimates suggest that 
disutility from loss was a multiple of two and half times the utility from an equal amount 
of gain.  
  
 
Figure 1: Utility from Gain and Loss 
 
It also leads to another exposition of this anomaly. The framing of choice by 
emphasizing gain more than losses or losses more than gains will also tend to influence 
investment choices. Even though, the information content in both cases may be exactly 
same.  
 
3. Rationale for the Study 
 
If markets are efficient, then, current prices will reflect all relevant information, either 
public or private. It implies that in an efficient market, it will be extremely difficult for any 
investor or any strategy to consistently beat the market and gain excess returns over 
the market return.  
 
However, in the real world, mutual funds and investment advisors do exist and earn 
handsome remuneration for their services. It is also observed that size of mutual funds‟ 
portfolios have increased in developed as well as developing countries. In Pakistan, for 
instance, despite there being almost no IPOs in last couple of years, the size of mutual 
funds industry has still grown.   
 
Coming to the investment decision making in funds or by individuals, there have been 
attempts made in past studies to analyze the investor behavior. Jensen (1968) 
analyzing 115 mutual funds over the period 1955-64 concluded that fees and expenses 
take away any advantage that the portfolio managers might have.  
 
Even if investment management fees and loads are added back to performance 
measures, and returns are measured gross of management expenses, Jensen 
concluded that on average, the funds apparently were not quite successful enough in 
their trading activities to cover even their brokerage expenses. 
 
It is also pertinent to study how soon the information is incorporated in the price and 
whether that is balanced on average or result in over or under reaction. For instance, in 
1987 stock market crash in USA, 22.6% value declined without any apparent news. 
Furthermore, over the years, 50 largest one-day stock price movements occurred on 
days of no major announcements. It has also been empirically established that inclusion 
of a stock in the S&P 500 index results in significant share price reactions.   
 
Overreaction leads past losers to become under priced and past winners to become 
overpriced. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) studied two portfolios of 35 stocks. One 
portfolio comprised past extreme winners over the prior three years and the other 
portfolio comprised past extreme losers over the prior three years.  
 
It was found that past losers outperformed winners over the next four years. Past losers 
were up 19.6% relative to the market; whereas, past winners were down 5% relative to 
the market. Hence, there was a difference of 24.6% between the two portfolio returns. 
 
Odean‟s (1999) study of overconfidence in the marketplace noted several important 
findings: 
 
 Frequent traders earn lesser returns as compared to less-frequent traders. 
 Overconfident traders hold under-diversified riskier portfolios. 
 Overconfident insiders improve price quality. Hence, they exploit the information.   
 Overconfident noise traders worsen price quality. Hence, speculation leads to 
price irregularity. 
 
In some studies, it has also been discovered that age plays a role in risk taking. Young 
and old fund managers behave differently because of career concerns. Young fund 
managers do not tend to take on much risk and hence avoid being in an odd position. 
Hence, herd behavior is not so uncommon in even the specialist investors. (Chevalier & 
Ellison, 1998) 
 
In the literature, there have been three motives for herding that are prominently noted 
and observed, i.e. information based herding, reputation based herding and 
compensation based herding. Information based herding occurs in situations when the 
analysts lack confidence in their private information. Reputation based herding is 
explained by the career concerns of the analysts and it will be more common among 
less experienced and young analysts. Compensation based herding is also influenced 
by the career concerns. Since deviation from the market consensus are rewarded less 
when they are right and penalized more when they are wrong, the young and 
inexperienced analysts would tend to herd more often.  
 
Cheng et al. (2006) studied the weights assignment by money market fund managers 
on the forecast recommendation of Buy-Side-Analysts (BSAs) and Sell-Side-Analysts 
(SSAs). They concluded that the optimal weight put on BSA‟s research by the fund 
management increases with the quality of their signals. According to them, the weight 
put on BSA‟s research also increased when the quality of the SSA‟s signal decreases. 
They also found that the weight depended on the degree of bias. When the degree of 
bias increases in SSA‟s forecast, it also led to increase in optimal weight put on BSA‟s 
forecasts. 
 
Brown et al. (2007) investigated the inclination of fund managers to herd, i.e. follow 
analysts‟ recommendations. They also tried to explore whether the herding behavior by 
fund managers had an impact on stock prices in turn.  
 
Discussing their findings, Brown et al. (2007) noted that mutual fund herding did have 
an influence on stock prices. In their study, it was found that mutual funds overreact 
when they engage in herding behavior. Positive consensus recommendation revisions 
resulted in a herd of funds buying a stock, while negative revisions result in a herd of 
funds selling a stock. They also concluded that herding on recommendation changes is 
driven partly by career incentives.  
 
Elliot et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between non-professional investors‟ 
information choices and their portfolio returns. They found that less-experienced 
nonprofessional investors earn lower returns as their use of unfiltered information 
increases relative to their use of filtered information.  
 
Contrarily, for more-experienced investors, they earn higher returns as their relative use 
of unfiltered information increases. Elliot et al (2008) interpreted the findings to suggest 
that the observed phenomenon was explained by investors‟ ability to make effective use 
of unfiltered information. They concluded that the relative use of information (unfiltered 
or filtered) did not determine the returns for investors.  
 
Noting the effect of investing experience, the noted scholars suggested that less-
experienced investors are likely to remain unable to use unfiltered information. This is 
not the case with more-experienced investors. Hence, investing experience affects the 
ability to make better use of unfiltered information and which determines the return. 
Relative availability of information content is not a principal determinant of returns.   
 
Other than herding, some studies have explained other psychological factors that affect 
different analysts‟ behavior. For instance, Chen & Jiang (2005) reasoned that 
overconfidence which is maintained over the holding of private information may result in 
deviation from consensus. 
 
In this current study done for the Pakistan‟s premier equity market, we try to analyze the 
investment decisions by professional investors. We attempt to analyze various links 
between demographic variables and choice of security valuation methods. We also try 
to find the evidence for various behavioral finance concepts and hypothesis like 
anchoring, herd behavior, overconfidence etc.        
 
 
 
 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1. Nature of Data 
 
Primary data is collected from 46 people who are professional analysts working in 
mutual funds, brokerage houses, investment companies etc. Data is collected through a 
structured questionnaire.  
 
4.2. Sampling Unit 
 
Sample unit comprises individual persons who are professionally working as financial 
analysts, fund managers, broker analysts, and research analysts in senior and junior 
positions. 
 
4.3. Sampling Methodology 
 
For sampling, a mix of convenience and snowball sampling method is used. 
 
4.4. Methods 
 
For analysis of data, descriptive tools are mostly used. Contingency tables used in the 
study also enable us to highlight possible relationships between different factors in the 
study.  
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
5.1. Profile of Respondents 
 
5.1.1. Age Profile 
 
Mean age of the respondents is 29 years. Median age of respondents is 27 years. It 
shows that mostly young people are hired for financial analysis tasks who are usually 
better trained and equipped with numerical computations and use of modern day 
software to carry out financial numerical analysis.  
 
5.1.2. Marital Status Profile 
 
We collect data on „marital status‟ so that we can relate marital status with security 
valuation methods used and identify whether people with more family expenditure 
requirements tend to be radical or conservative in their forecasts. If they herd more, 
then, they are conservative forecasters. In next sections, we present the evidence. 
Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of this variable.    
 
 
 
 
Marital Status Number of Respondents 
Married With Kids 15 
Married With No Kids 5 
Single 26 
 
Table 1: Marital Status Profile of Respondents 
 
5.1.3. Designation Profile 
 
Table 2 shows the profile of respondents by designation. It can be seen that the 
analysts taken for study in this sample are working in both senior/supervisory and junior 
positions. Table 2 gives the frequency distribution of this variable.    
 
Designation Number of Respondents 
Fund Manager 8 
Head of Research 4 
Stock Broker 4 
Senior Analyst 16 
Junior Analyst 14 
 
Table 2: Designation Profile of Respondents 
 
5.2. Forecast for KSE for 3QCY13 
 
We ask the analysts to forecast the market movement in next quarter, i.e. July to 
September 2013. Table 3 reports the results. 
 
Forecast  
(% Change) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
-10 3 6.52 6.52 
-5 3 6.52 13.04 
0 7 15.22 28.26 
5 19 41.20 69.57 
10 14 30.43 100.00 
Total 46 100.00  
  
Table 3: Forecast for KSE for 3QCY13 
 
Average result of their forecasts is 4.13% computed as grouped mean. Hence, on 
average, market participants comprising professional analysts think that market will rise 
by 4.13% during Jul-Sep 2013.  
 
It can be seen from table 4 that bullish past influences the future expectation. Market 
return in excess of 10% in 1QCY2013 and 2QCY2013 influences the investors to carry 
the bullish sentiments forward in 3QCY13. 
 
 
 
Date Close Value Return 
2-Jan-13 17,242.74   
1-Feb-13 18,173.67 5.40% 
1-Mar-13 18,043.31 -0.72% 
1-Apr-13 18,982.42 5.20% 
2-May-13 21,823.05 14.96% 
3-Jun-13 21,005.69 -3.75% 
1-Jul-13 21,363.16 1.70% 
      
Average Monthly Return  3.80% 
Average Overall Return 23.90% 
1QCY2013 Return 10.09% 
2QCY2013 Return 12.54% 
 
Table 4: Past Returns in KSE for CY 2013 
 
5.3. Analysis from Behavioral Finance Perspective 
 
5.3.1. Marital Status & Herding  
 
It can be seen from table 5 that 80% of the unmarried people do not follow market 
consensus as compared to 40% of married people with no kids and 60% of married 
people with kids. This shows that possibly single people are less conservative and more 
ambitious in their financial valuation.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Marital Status & Herding  
 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   4.2541   Pr = 0.119
                100.00     100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 32.61      10.87      56.52      100.00 
     Total          15          5         26          46 
                                                        
                 40.00      60.00      19.23       30.43 
                 42.86      21.43      35.71      100.00 
         1           6          3          5          14 
                                                        
                 60.00      40.00      80.77       69.57 
                 28.13       6.25      65.63      100.00 
         0           9          2         21          32 
                                                        
 Consensus   Married W  Married N     Single       Total
    Market            Marital Status
It maybe because of the following reasons: 
 
a) Career concern. Their forecast error will be heavily penalized than the errors 
made by experienced forecasters. But, still for career growth and to stand out, 
they take the risk.   
 
b) Low opportunities to switch jobs in initial phase of career. Hence, they want to 
advance with performance that stands out. 
 
c) Coming from the academia, they have inclination to use tools that may not be 
used generally by existing analysts. Hence, their forecast may differ from others 
and they may have more confidence and credence in their numerical capabilities 
to understand the workings of capital markets and frictions.  
 
d) No past forecasting success in career which could act as a cushion if they make 
errors.       
 
5.3.2. Age & Herding  
 
For defining the age group, we categorized analysts as young and old. Analysts with 
age less than 30 are considered young and analysts with age greater than 30 are 
considered old. It can be seen from table 6 that 75% of the young people do not follow 
market consensus as compared to 55% of old people. This further reinforces the above 
findings. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Age Group & Herding 
 
5.3.3. Overconfidence 
 
In the table, we see that analysts are overconfident and this result is consistent with 
earlier studies as well. People tend to be overconfident about their abilities, trade more 
than necessary, create noise and volatility in the market which is capitalized by some 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.5404   Pr = 0.215
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 76.09      23.91      100.00 
     Total          35         11          46 
                                             
                 25.71      45.45       30.43 
                 64.29      35.71      100.00 
         1           9          5          14 
                                             
                 74.29      54.55       69.57 
                 81.25      18.75      100.00 
         0          26          6          32 
                                             
 Consensus       Young        Old       Total
    Market         Age Group
other investors and hence abnormal returns do tend to occur to some strategies and to 
some participants.   
 
It can be seen from table 7 that less than 5% people rate themselves below average. 
More than one third of analysts in the sample rate themselves above average. 
 
Self Rating Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Above Average 16 34.78 34.78 
Average 28 60.87 95.65 
Below Average 2 4.35 100.00 
Total 46 100.00  
 
Table 7: Self-Rating by Respondents 
 
5.4. Mean Income Comparison by Designation 
 
Monthly ungrouped mean income in the sample of 46 respondents is Rs 112,500. The 
table shows that investors or the management of mutual fund or brokerage is willing to 
incur higher cost to source quality labor force to make the investments and manage 
portfolios and offer investment advice. The distribution of income by designation in the 
sample results gives an exploratory view of monthly compensation in table 8.      
 
Designation Mean Monthly Income (Rs.) 
Fund Manager 142,500 
Head of Research 318,750 
Stock Broker 156,875 
Senior Analyst 96,875 
Junior Analyst 41,607 
 
Table 8: Income Distribution by Designation 
 
5.5. Mean Income Comparison by Education 
 
Though, nothing causal and conclusive could be said from an exploratory nature of the 
study and limited sample size, but few interesting things are pointed out. The table 9 
shows that financial analysis industry has merit and it compensates based on education 
which represents the skill level of an analyst. Foreign university degree and CFA earn 
more than local university degree holders.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education Mean Monthly Income (Rs.) 
Graduation – Local University 67,500 
Post Graduation – Local University 112,968 
Graduation – Foreign University 375,000 
Post Graduation – Foreign University 145,000 
ACCA 51,250 
CFA 153,928 
 
Table 9: Income Distribution by Education 
 
5.6. Mean Years of Experience at Particular Designation 
 
The table 10 shows that possibly promotion within the financial analysis industry is not 
necessarily a function of experience. While junior analysts take time to progress, not all 
people who have spent same working experience go up the ladder necessarily. This is 
also substantiated a bit by the fact that correlation between income and experience is 
0.38.       
 
Designation Mean Experience 
Fund Manager 7.09 
Head of Research 8.75 
Stock Broker 9.75 
Senior Analyst 7.59 
Junior Analyst 3.01 
 
Table 10: Experience by Designation 
 
5.7. Appraisal Frequency 
 
The table 11 shows the appraisal frequency. It can be seen that there is tendency in 
some organizations for a more frequent appraisal. But, mostly, performance appraisal is 
done on annual basis.   
 
Experience Mean Experience 
Monthly 8 
Quarterly 6 
Half Yearly 3 
Annually 29 
 
Table 11: Appraisal Frequency 
 
5.8. Use of Valuation Methods by Education 
 
Table 12 shows the relative frequency with which different valuation methods are used 
by the analysts. We categorize the choices by the educational background. The legends 
are described as follows: 
 
CAPM  - Capital Asset Pricing Models 
MFM  - Multi-Factor Models 
DDM  - Dividend Discount Models 
TA  - Technical Analysis 
FM  - Financial Models 
TS  - Time Series Tools (ARIMA, GARCH, ARIMA, VAR) etc 
MC  - Capital Asset Pricing Model   
 
 
Education / 
Methods 
CAPM 
(%) 
MFM 
(%) 
DDM 
(%) 
TA (%) FM (%) TS  
(%) 
MC 
(%) 
Local Graduate 47.1 35.3 58.8 35.29 17.7 5.88 17.7 
Local Masters 50.0 25.0 56.3 25.0 12.5 6.25 37.5 
Foreign Graduate 50.0 50.0 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 
Foreign Masters 50.0 100 50.0 100 100 100 50.0 
ACCA 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 100 50.0 
CFA 71.4 28.60 100.0 42.9 42.9 14.3 26.6 
 
Table 12: Security Valuation Methods Used by Education 
 
Table 13 shows the relative frequency with which different valuation methods are used. 
It can be seen that DDM is used most frequently, followed by CAPM, Technical analysis 
and market consensus. 
 
It is interesting to note that one third of respondents in the sample use technical 
analysis; hence, they do not believe that weak form efficiency strictly holds for 
Pakistan‟s premier equity market. Hence, they believe that past price formations have 
useful information and can be used to earn excess returns. We also find that almost one 
third of the respondents tend to follow market consensus. Since, few large block trades 
historically have moved stock prices away from fundamental values, analysts do not 
want to deviate too much from the market consensus.  
 
Time series tools are used by only 3 out of 46 respondents. It may very well be because 
of lack of skills set since most business schools and curriculum of professional 
certifications do not give a rigorous training of these tools. It also points towards the fact 
the economics schools need to fill this gap as they alone train their students in 
econometrics techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valuation Method Number of Respondents Percent (%) 
CAPM 24 52.17 
MFM 12 26.09 
DDM 29 63.04 
TA 15 32.61 
FM 10 21.74 
TS 3 6.52 
MC 14 30.43 
 
Table 13: Security Valuation Methods 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this study, we tried to analyze the investment decisions made by professional 
investors. We attempted to analyze various links between demographic variables and 
choice of security valuation methods. We also tried to find the evidence for various 
behavioral finance concepts and hypothesis like anchoring, herd behavior, 
overconfidence etc.        
 
Our results indicate prevalence of herding and overconfidence. We also find that 
investors extrapolate past information into the future. We also find association between 
demographic characteristics and choice of security valuation methods. We find that 
young people herd less in our sample of analysts than the old people.           
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